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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Leon Johnson appeals from the judgment of conviction for two
counts of lewd conduct.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Johnson's daughter, seven-year-old A.J., reported to her mother on two
occasions that Johnson had touched her genital area or had her touch his penis.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 618, L. 23- p. 621, L. 12; p. 669, L. 6- p. 673, L. 6; p. 685, L.

7 - p. 686, L. 17; p. 760, L. 8 - p. 793, L. 5.) A grand jury indicted Johnson on
three counts of lewd conduct with a child. (R., vol. I, pp. 1-4.) After a trial, the
jury convicted Johnson on two counts, and acquitted on the third. (R., vol. II, pp.

320-21.)
The district court sentenced Johnson to two concurrent terms of 20 years
with five years fixed. (R., vol. II, pp. 343-47.) Johnson filed a timely appeal. (R.,
vol. II, pp. 356-58.)
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ISSUES

Due to the length of Appellant's statement of the issues, it is not
reproduced here. It may be found at Appellant's brief, p.18. The state rephrases
the issues on appeal as:
1.
The district court allowed the presentation of evidence of a prior incident of
sexual abuse by Johnson against a younger sister that was similar to the charges
in the present case. Has Johnson failed to show error in the district court's
decision to allow admission of evidence of prior bad acts by Johnson under 1.R.E.
404(b)?
2.
The trial court allowed the victim's mother to testify that when she
confronted Johnson with the victim's statements that he had molested her
Johnson claimed that the victim had seen him masturbating while watching a
pornographic movie. Has Johnson failed to show that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of Johnson's own statements to his wife when she confronted
him with evidence that he had abused his daughter?
3.
The trial court excluded some defense evidence because it was not
disclosed. Has Johnson failed to show that the court abused its discretion in
excluding the evidence as a discovery sanction?
4.
Has Johnson failed to show that the sentences imposed by the district
court are an abuse of that court's sentencing discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling That Prior
Evidence Of Sexual Abuse By Johnson Was Admissible Under I.R.E. 404/b)
A.

Introduction
The district judge overruled Johnson's objections and permitted the

introduction of evidence that Johnson had sexually abused his eight-year-old
sister in a manner similar to how he sexually molested his six-year-old daughter.
(Trial Tr.. vol. I, p. 947, L. 3 - p. 954, L. 25; vol. II, p. 957, L. 6 - p. 961, L. 24.)
Johnson argues first that this Court should overrule precedent and hold that
corroboration is not a proper basis for finding "prior bad act" evidence relevant for
a purpose other than propensity. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-31.) This argument
fails because Johnson has failed to show grounds for departing from existing
precedent.

Johnson also argues that the evidence was inadmissible under

existing standards.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 19, 32-35.)

This argument fails

because the evidence was relevant for purposes other than propensity, and
Johnson has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are generally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); State

v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 82, 878 P.2d 776, 781 (1994). Rulings under I.R.E.
404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is
admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given free review while the
determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
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outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008).
C.

The Principle Of Stare Decisis Should Be Followed
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of

stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is

manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002);
State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990));
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaqa, 125 Idaho
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question,
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the
court must be] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring).
Johnson argues on appeal that this Court should overturn the "line of
cases" beginning with State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,819 P.2d 1143 (1991), and
State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992). (Appellant's brief, pp.
24-31.)

He has failed, however, to show the holdings of Moore and Tolman are

unjust or unwise or that overruling those cases is necessary to remedy any
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continuing injustice. Indeed, Johnson only offers argument that has already been
considered and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Rule 404(b) expressly allows admission of other bad acts evidence when
offered for a purpose other than to show character. See, §&, State

v. Martin,

118 Idaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007 (1990) (upholding the admissibility of sex offenses
occurring ten and twelve years before the charged sex offense); Moore, 120
Idaho at 747, 819 P.2d at 1147 (affirming the district court's order denying motion
in limine allowing admission of evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct
with similarly aged minor female relatives to show a common scheme or plan,
motive, lustful intent, and specific intent); Tolman, 121 Idaho at 904-05, 828 P.2d
at 1309-10 (same). Permissible purposes include proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

I.RE. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); Tolman,
121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304; Moore, 120 Idaho 743,819 P.2d 1143; State v.
Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior
bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant to prove some issue other than the
defendant's character, and (b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not
substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice.

State v. Cross,

132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also repeatedly reaffirmed that, due to the
particular proof problems in sex offense cases involving minor victims, evidence
of other, similar misconduct by the defendant is relevant and admissible to
corroborate the victim's testimony. See, §&, State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho
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89, 93, 685 P.2d 830, 834 (1984) ("Evidence of similar acts of sexual misconduct
between a defendant and the victim or between the defendant and another
witness is admissible for corroboration of the victim's testimony in sex crime
cases"); Moore, 120 Idaho at 745,819 P.2d at 1145 (same), Tolman, 121 Idaho
at 904,828 P.2d at 1309 (same); Phillips, 123 Idaho at 181, 845 P.2d at 1214
(same); State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 605-07, 977 P.2d 211, 219-21 (Ct.
App. 1998), review granted and affirmed in State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 977
P.2d 203 (1999); State v. Spor, 134 Idaho 315, 319-20, 1 P.3d 816, 820-21 (Ct.
App. 2000); State v. Law, 136 Idaho 721, 726-27, 39 P.3d 661, 666-67 (Ct. App.
2002) (same); State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538,541, 50 P.3d 1033, 1036 (Ct. App.
2002) (same); State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 198 n.1, 923 P.2d 439,443 n.1
(1996) (recognizing the rule in Moore and Tolman). As a result, prior bad acts
can be admissible to prove a common scheme or plan or to provide corroboration
of a child victim's testimony, among other things.
Relying primarily on the dissenting arguments in Moore and Tolman,
Johnson argues that because the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the
corroboration requirement in State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159,627 P.2d 788 (1981),
a rape case involving an adult victim, there is no good reason for treating
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any sex crime differently for 404(b) purposes. 1

(Appellant's brief, pp.20-26.)

This claim lacks merit and is unsupported by Idaho cases.
Johnson's argument appears to rest on the faulty assumption that
elimination of the corroboration requirement in sex crime cases made
corroborating evidence irrelevant.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-27.)

Clearly,

abolishing a rule that a case may not go to the jury unless the victim's testimony
is corroborated is not a determination that corroboration is no longer relevant as
a matter of law. To the contrary, corroboration -- especially in child molestation
cases -- is particularly relevant. See State v. Kremer, 144 Idaho 286,291, 160
P.3d 443, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Due to particular proof problems in [child sex
abuse] cases, the Idaho Supreme Court considers such corroborating evidence
especially relevant.") This rationale recognizes the reality that sexual exploitation
of children is a crime to which there are rarely third-party witnesses and that
these cases are a credibility contest between an adult defendant and a minor
child victim subjected to a defense that focuses on challenging the victim's
credibility. Tolman, 121 Idaho at 904-905, 828 P.2d at 1309-10 (quoting People
v. Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 88, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224-25 (1967)); Law, 136
Idaho at 726-27, 39 P.3d at 666-67.

1

Johnson further claims that if the exception is "being applied across the board in
all sex crime cases," it cannot be supported by the "common scheme or plan"
language of I.R.E. 404(b) because "that language necessarily calls for a case by
case analysis." (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27). Johnson's claim that the Idaho
courts have abandoned a case-by-case analysis is without any support in his
brief or in the applicable precedents.
7

Rule 404{b) allows admission of prior act evidence for any purpose other
than as proof of propensity. I.R.E. 404{b). Tolman and Moore simply hold that
corroborative evidence serves such a purpose. Consequently, the admission of
similar prior bad acts in child sex crime cases to show some fact other than
propensity is not an exception to the rule but rather a correct application of I.R.E.
404{b).
In sum, Johnson has failed to show that the case-by-case analysis
required by I.R.E. 404{b), as illustrated by Moore, Tolman, and their progeny,
have "proven over time to be unjust or unwise" or that "overruling [those cases] is
necessary to vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued
injustice."

Humphreys, 134 Idaho at 660, 8 P.3d at 655.

Consequently, the

policy behind stare decisis applies and requires this Court to follow long-standing
precedent. The district court's judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

D.

Applying The Correct Standards For Admissibility Shows That Johnson
Has Failed To Show Error
Rule 404{b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of

other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" is generally inadmissible to prove the character of
a person or that the person acted in conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b).
Such evidence is admissible, however, to prove matters other than propensity.
I.R.E. 404(b). The district court must therefore first determine whether the
evidence is probative to matters other than propensity. Second, the district court
must weigh the probative value as to matters other than propensity against the
danger of unfair prejudice, i.e., the likelihood that the trier of fact would consider
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the evidence as going to character or propensity. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,
670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). Evidence is excludable under the second prong
of this test only if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65
(2003).
The district court specifically found the evidence in question relevant to the
issue of corroboration due to the similarities of the prior conduct and the charged
conduct. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 957, L. 11 - p. 959, L. 24.) Specifically, the court found
the similarities in the victims' ages (around eight and seven, respectively), in their
relationship to the defendant (a sister eight years younger and a daughter), and
in the acts performed (having each touch his penis). (Tr., vol. 11, p. 957, L. 11 p. 959, L. 24.)
Johnson argues that the evidence was not relevant because the prior act
happened "about 25 years prior to the incidents in the case at hand," 2 and
Johnson was about 16 years old at the time of the prior acts. He further claims
that being an older sibling is not comparable to being a father and that the acts
were not that similar. (Appellant's brief, p. 34.) Although Johnson is correct that
there was considerable time between the lewd acts, and there are some

2

It is not clear how Johnson concluded that the molestation of his sister
happened "about 25 years ago." Johnson's sister testified that the abuse started
when Johnson was about 16, and continued for a bout a year and one-half.
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 964, L. 5 - p. 965, L. 9.) Johnson's date of birth is
(PSI, p. 1.) Thus, it appears that the molestations began in about 1973
and continued to about 1975. The lewd conduct at issue happened in 2004 (R.,
pp. 1-2), less than 20 years after the time the molestations of the sister stopped.
9

dissimilarities between the different acts of molestation, such shows neither
irrelevance nor an abuse of discretion.
Johnson was 16 when he sexually abused his sister about 20 years ago.
(See footnote 2, supra.) The district court also found, however, that there was
great similarity between the two victims in that they were near in age. (Trial Tr.,
vol. 11, p. 958, Ls. 20-23.) The court found some similarities in the relationships
the victims had to Johnson, in that an older brother can be an authority figure to a
young child. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 958, L. 22 - p. 959, L. 2.) It also found similarity
in the acts involved, in that both victims reported that Johnson had them touch
his penis. (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 959, Ls. 2-9.) The judge in weighing the potential
for prejudice against the probative value recognized the potential prejudice, but
further recognized that one basis for attacking the credibility of the victim was the
defense claim that her memories had been implanted through interviews. (Trial
Tr., vol. II, p. 959, Ls. 10-24.) Finally, the judge gave an instruction to the jury
limiting its consideration of the evidence. (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 959, L. 25 - p. 961,
L. 24; p. 1328, L. 6- p. 1331, L. 20; p. 1334, L. 23- p. 1335, L. 12; R., vol. 11, p.
317.)
Johnson has failed to show that the evidence was irrelevant.

The

evidence was relevant to corroborate the victim. Nor has Johnson established
an abuse of discretion.

On the contrary, the court carefully considered the

evidence under the correct legal standard and deemed it admissible, and further
instructed the jury to minimize the risk that the jury would treat the prior bad act
evidence as evidence of propensity. Kremer, 144 Idaho at 291-92, 160 P.3d at
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448-49. Finally, even if the court had erred, the totality of the record shows such
error harmless, especially in light of the limiting instruction.

II.
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His
Reaction When Confronted

A.

Introduction
When the victim first disclosed Johnson's abuse to her mother, she

confronted Johnson, then her husband, about the abuse. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 686,
L. 18 - p. 687, L. 9.) Johnson responded by claiming that what had actually
happened was that the victim came into his room while he was masturbating and
watching a pornographic movie, and that she had "gotten an eyeful." (Trial Tr.,
vol. I, p. 687, L. 10 - p. 688, L. 8.) She did not report Johnson to the authorities
at that time, in part because of Johnson's explanation. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 688, L.
9 - p. 689, L. 13.) The court allowed the evidence as tending to show why the
mother did not immediately disclose the abuse to authorities, and found that the
potential unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 664, L. 8 - p. 665, L. 20.) Johnson later denied that his wife
had confronted him with any allegations and that he had provided her with any
explanation. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1266, L. 14- p. 1267, L. 2.)
Johnson argues that the district court erred, and should have excluded the
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's brief, pp. 37-41.) Specifically, he first
argues that the evidence was irrelevant except to rehabilitate the witness.
(Appellant's brief, p. 39.) Second, he argues that the evidence was prejudicial
because the jury would frown on the acts of watching pornography and
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masturbating. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-40.) These arguments have no merit ·
because the state was not introducing the evidence for the truth of the matter
asserted.
B.

Standard Of Review
The district court's admission of evidence at trial is reviewed under an

abuse of discretion standard, and the court's decision to admit such evidence will
be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Myers v.
Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 505, 95 P.3d 977, 988 (2004).
However, relevancy is a question of law and is thus reviewed de novo. lg_,_

C.

The State Did Not Proffer The Evidence To Prove The Truth Of The
Matter Asserted
Johnson characterizes the evidence in question as evidence that he

watched pornography and masturbated.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 37-41.)

This

mischaracterizes the evidence: the evidence was that Johnson, confronted with
his daughter's allegations that he had sexually molested her, said that what had
actually happened was that his daughter saw him performing the acts in
question. In other words, the evidence was of what Johnson said, not evidence
that what he said was true. The state's theory was that Johnson sexually abused
his daughter, not that the whole thing was a misunderstanding because the
daughter saw him masturbating while watching a pornographic movie. Thus, the
state presented evidence of what Johnson said, under the theory that what he
said was not true. Because the evidence was never evidence of prior bad acts,

I.RE. 404(b) does not apply.
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Because I.RE. 404(b) does not apply, Johnson has failed to show error.
Even if I.RE. 404(b) did apply, however, the evidence is relevant to show the
entire course of action associated with the crime. See State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho
667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-19,
878 P.2d 188, 191-193 (Ct. App. 1994). In addition, the claim of prejudice is
incredible because if the jury had believed Johnson's explanation, they would
have disbelieved that the crime occurred. Johnson has failed to show an abuse
of discretion.

111.
Johnson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Excluding Undisclosed Evidence
A.

Introduction
The trial in this case started on Monday, July 10, 2006, and proceeded

through Friday, July 14, 2006. (R, vol. II, pp. 215-35, 269-96; Trial Tr., vol. I, p.
2.) The trial resumed the next Wednesday, July 19, 2006. (R, vol. II, pp. 299309; Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2.) On that Wednesday, the sixth day of trial, the defense
presented notice of intent to call Diane Peterson, Johnson's sister, as a witness
and to submit evidence of personal journal entries of Peterson and Leon
Johnson, Johnson's father. (R, vol. 11, pp. 297-98; Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 1050, Ls.
4-9.) The purpose of the journal entries was to attempt to show that the victim's
mother, Michelle Johnson, was not in Utah with the children other than the victim
when the abuse took place, as she had stated in her testimony, but had on
March 20, 2004, attended a family gathering in Idaho with Johnson. (Trial Tr.,
vol. II, p. 1051, Ls. 4-10; p. 1060, L. 18- p. 1062, L. 10; see also vol. I, p. 697, L.
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1 - p. 703, L. 6 (Michelle Johnson testified she took the other children to Utah,
leaving Johnson and the victim home alone, from March 19, 2004, to either
March 21 or 22).)
The state objected to the late defense disclosure and asked that the court
prohibit the use of the late-disclosed evidence.

(Trial Tr., p. 1050, L. 10 - p.

1053, L. 1; p. 1057, L. 5 - p. 1058, L. 13.) Counsel for the defense represented
that his client had notified him of the existence of the evidence the night before,
and that the copies of the journal entries he provided had been transcribed out of
hand-written originals not in his possession. (Trial Tr., p. 1053, L. 4 - p. 1056, L.
13.) The district court asked the prosecution what investigation it would need to
undertake to respond to the undisclosed evidence. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1058, Ls.
14-15.) The prosecutor was not sure; the state would want to investigate the
authenticity of the journals, perhaps through the state lab, but at that point the
originals had still not been produced. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1058, L. 16 - p. 1059,
L. 1.) Defense counsel believed the originals could be produced later that day.
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1059, Ls. 2-11.)
The court first held that Leon Johnson, who had been disclosed as a
witness, could testify.

(Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 1059, Ls. 12-14.)

The court

provisionally ruled that Leon Johnson's journal would also come in, but that the
court would allow the state to examine the original and again present on the
issue of prejudice once it determined what it would need to do to respond to the
new disclosure. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1059, L. 15 - p. 1060, L. 3.) The court
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excluded both testimony from and the journal of Diane Peterson. (Trial Tr., vol.
II, p. 1060, Ls. 4-13.)
The prosecutor later had the opportunity to examine Leon Johnson's
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1067, L. 21 - p. 1070, L. 8.)

purported journal.

The

prosecutor elected to call Leon Johnson in its case in chief and have him testify
about the journal entry indicating that the victim's mother was in Leon Johnson's
house on March 20, 2004. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1072, L. 2- p. 1078, L. 3.) A copy
of the journal was entered into evidence. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1084, L. 17 - p.
1087, L. 18.) The state then called witnesses to bolster the mother's testimony
that she had gone to Utah with the other children, leaving the victim alone with
Johnson, in March of 2004. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1092, L. 9 - p. 1094, L. 11; p.
1095, L. 4-p. 1098, L. 21; p. 1103, L. 20-p. 1108, L. 2; p. 1118, L. 19-p.
1121, L. 20.) The state also re-called the mother to the stand to address whether
she could have had the specific date that she went to Utah with the other
children, leaving the victim and Johnson home alone, wrong. (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p.
1129, L. 9 - p. 1133, L. 23.) Then the state rested. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1141, L.
15-p.1145, L.12.)
Johnson took the stand in his own defense. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1214, L.
20 - p. 1215, L. 5.) During his testimony the defense tried to admit a document
purporting to show that the victim's mother had done work at home on Saturday,
March 20, 2004.

(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1225, L. 18 - p. 1228, L. 25.)

The

prosecutor objected to the document as it had never been produced in discovery.
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1229, L. 4 - p. 1231, L. 2.) The defense claimed it had no
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duty to provide the document in discovery because it was impeachment. (Trial
Tr., vol. II, p. 1231, L. 5 - p. 1232, L. 22.) The trial court rejected that argument,
pointing out to the defense that the rules created a clear duty to provide
documents it intended to introduce at trial. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1232, L. 23 - p.
1233, L. 9.)
On appeal Johnson argues that the court denied him a fair trial by
excluding the evidence that would have been offered by Diane Peterson and the
document he tried to offer in his own testimony. (Appellant's brief, pp. 41-51.)
Review of the record, however, shows that the sanction imposed by the court for
the defendant's repeated discovery violations was well within its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The choice of an appropriate sanction, or whether to impose a sanction at

all, for a party's failure to comply with a discovery request or order is within the
discretion of the trial court." State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 405, 958 P.2d 22,
31 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). See also, State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho
203,208,899 P.2d 416,421 (1995); State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d
495, 496 (1977); State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 812, 864 P.2d 644, 650 (Ct.
App. 1993). "[T]he trial court's exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview
of a reviewing court unless it has been clearly abused." Stradley, 127 Idaho at
208,899 P.2d at421 (citing Buss, 98 Idaho at 174,560 P.2d at496).
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C.

Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Excluding Late-Disclosed Evidence
Idaho's discovery rules require the defendant, when requested, to allow

the prosecution to inspect documents "which the defendant intends to introduce
in evidence at the trial," and to "furnish the State a list of names and addresses of
witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial."

I.C.R. 16(c). The failure to

comply with a discovery request, unless excused by "good cause or excusable
neglect," is "grounds for the imposition of sanctions by the court." I.C.R. 16(e)(2).
When deciding whether to exclude a witness as a sanction for the defendant's
discovery violations, the court must "weigh the prejudice to the state against the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 457, 988 P.2d
680, 683 (1999) (citing State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 634, 945 P.2d 1, 5
(1997)). "The court is also obligated to consider less severe remedies ... that
might serve as an alternative to excluding the evidence." State v. Saxton, 133
Idaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999).
1.

Johnson Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The
District Court's Decision To Exclude Evidence From Diane
Peterson

The record shows that the district court clearly understood and intelligently
applied its discretion in imposing a sanction for the defendant's repeated
discovery violations. The court did allow the defense to present Leon Johnson's
journal as evidence despite the failure to disclose this evidence, yet ruled that
because Diane Peterson had not been disclosed as a witness, neither she nor
her journal would be admitted.

That the judge did not exclude all untimely
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disclosed evidence shows that the judge was discriminating in choosing an
appropriate sanction.
First, Johnson's argument that he did not know about the evidence until
the night before the disclosure is unconvincing. Even assuming that the defense
did not know about the journals, he clearly knew that Diane Peterson was a
witness to the March 20 family meeting. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 1222, L. 17 - p. 1224, L.
2 (Johnson testified that meeting was significant "because all of my siblings were
present").)

The defense knew all along that Diane Peterson was a potential

witness, yet did not disclose her until the sixth day of trial.

Had the defense

disclosed her as a potential witness, there is no reason to think that the trial court
would not have allowed both her testimony and the introduction of her journal.
Second, the defense here presented was very similar to an alibi, as it
undercut the state's theory of who was present where and when. To adequately
investigate the state would have had to look for evidence of Diane Peterson's
whereabouts on March 20, which might have included numerous interviews. It
would also have had to check into whether there was evidence of recent
fabrication of the journal, perhaps through scientific testing.

Johnson's

conclusion, unsupported by any analysis, that a continuance would have allowed
the state to adequately investigate (Appellant's brief, p. 46) fails to show error.
Finally, Johnson's claim that his trial was rendered unfair is without merit.
The defense was allowed to present evidence of the family meeting on March 20,

2004, through the testimony of Leon Johnson (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 1072, L. 2 - p.
1078, L. 3), through the journal of Leon Johnson (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 1084, L. 17 -
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p. 1087, L. 18), and through the testimony of the defendant himself (Trial Tr., vol.

II, p. 1222, L. 17 - p. 1225, L. 17). Michelle Johnson herself admitted that there
may have been such a meeting and she may have attended, and if she did what
that meant is that she had gone to Utah a different weekend in March. (Trial Tr.,
vol. 11, p. 1131, L. 2 - p. 1137, L. 2.)

Any evidence that might have been

presented by Diane Peterson was largely cumulative, and its exclusion did not
deprive Johnson of a fair trial. Thus, Johnson has failed to show that the district
court improperly balanced the prejudice to the state against Johnson's right to a
fair trial.

2.

Johnson Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The Trial
Court's Decision To Exclude The Purported Timesheet

As stated above, the trial court also excluded a document prepared by
Johnson purporting to be a timesheet showing that Michelle Johnson had done
transcription work at her home on March 20, 2004. Johnson has failed to show
that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this undisclosed evidence
either, for the reasons stated above. The only true difference here is that the
reason put forth by the defense to the trial court -- that it was not required to
disclose the document - was fatuous. See !.C.R. 16(c)(1). That the defense
was trying to gain tactical advantage through manipulation of discovery is further
support for the district court's actions. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415-17
(1988).
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IV.

Johnson Has Failed To Show That His Sentence Is An Abuse Of Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court sentenced Johnson to two concurrent terms of 20 years

with five years fixed. (R., vol. II, pp. 343-47.) Johnson argues that the district
court "failed

to properly consider the

mitigating factors"

of Johnson's

psychosexual evaluation, support of friends and family, and his lack of record
and status as a first-time offender.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 53-59.) Johnson's

argument is directly contrary to the record.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will r-eview

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

1.1h

Johnson Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

1.1h In determining whether the appellant met his burden, the court considers the
entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is exclusively
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the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will
be the period of actual incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
As set forth above, Johnson was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct
for having sexual contact with his seven-year-old daughter. The victim testified
to repeated sexual contact inflicted by Johnson. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 767, L. 2 - p.
778, L. 4.)
In sentencing the district court specifically considered the relevant legal
criteria. (Sentencing Tr., p. 88, L. 16 - p. 89, L. 3; p. 91, L. 16 - p. 98, L. 3.)
Contrary to Johnson's appellate claims, the district court specifically considered
as mitigating:

(1) the letters written by Johnson's family members, but

specifically discounted claims of factual innocence contained therein (Sentencing
Tr., p. 90, L. 11 - p. 91, L. 15), (2) the psychosexual evaluation, though felt it was
less reliable because the report indicated Johnson was minimizing and he had
directly lied about employment issues to the evaluator (Sentencing Tr., p. 91, L.
16 - p. 93, L. 20), and (3) that this was Johnson's first felony offense, which the
court considered a "strong mitigating factor" (Sentencing Tr., p. 95, Ls. 1-8; p. 96,
Ls. 10-15). The court also concluded that treatment could probably be provided
best outside of prison due to the limited programs available in prison, another
mitigating factor. (Sentencing Tr., p. 93, L. 21 - p. 94, L. 8.)
The court further concluded, however, that a lesser sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of the crime, that an imposed sentence would provide
deterrence, that Johnson's conduct knowingly caused "grave and irreparable
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harm to the victim," that there was no provocation, and that there was no excuse
or justification for his conduct. (Sentencing Tr., p. 94, L. 9 - p. 96, L. 6.) The
court specifically stated that it had weighed the aggravators against the
mitigators (especially the two "strong" mitigators of the psychosexual evaluation
and the lack of prior record) and concluded that a sentence of 20 years with five
determinate was appropriate. (Sentencing Tr., p. 97, L. 7 - p. 99, L. 13.)
Johnson's claim that the court gave improper weight to the mitigating
factors is simply belied by the record. The court gave serious consideration to
what it believed were strong mitigators, but merely concluded that the
seriousness of the crime, and other factors, required the sentences imposed.
Johnson has failed to show error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment of convictions and sentences.
DATED this 6th day of October 2008.
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